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Aiming at a better specification of the concept of “control” in brain-computer-interfaces
(BCIs) and neurofeedback (NF) research, we propose to distinguish “self-control of
brain activity” from the broader concept of “BCI control”, since the first describes a
neurocognitive phenomenon and is only one of the many components of “BCI control”.
Based on this distinction, we developed a framework based on dual-processes theory
that describes the cognitive determinants of self-control of brain activity as the interplay of
automatic vs. controlled information processing. Further, we distinguish between cognitive
processes that are necessary and sufficient to achieve a given level of self-control of brain
activity and those which are not. We discuss that those cognitive processes which are
not necessary for the learning process can hamper self-control because they cannot be
completely turned-off at any time. This framework aims at a comprehensive description
of the cognitive determinants of the acquisition of self-control of brain activity underlying
those classes of BCI which require the user to achieve regulation of brain activity as well
as NF learning.
Keywords: BCI, neurofeedback, executive functions, dual-process theory, rumination, meta-cognition, cognitive
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INTRODUCTION
Brain computer interfaces (BCIs) make possible the direct
communication pathway between the brain and an external
device. BCIs are often directed at assisting, augmenting, or repair-
ing human cognitive or sensory-motor functions. Individuals
learn how to induce certain patterns of brain activity, which can
be detected and transcoded into some form of action or feedback
in the external device. One special case of BCI is neurofeedback
(NF), in which the aim is not to control an external device
but rather to use external feedback to modulate specific aspects
of physiological signal intrinsic to the brain. Both human and
nonhuman animals are able to learn to use BCI/NF with a short
amount of training (Sterman, 1977; Nicolelis and Lebedev, 2009;
Phillippens and Vanwersch, 2010).
Generally, the term “BCI control” has been used interchange-
ably to refer to two different processes. On the one side, “BCI
control” refers to the ability to control an external device and
can be seen mainly as a complex problem of neuroengineer-
ing (Donoghue, 2008). This definition simultaneously involves
neuro-bio-psychological, data analytical and ergonomical aspects
(see Kübler et al., 2011). On the other side, “BCI control” may
refer to the much more specific ability of an individual to con-
trol some aspects of his/her own brain activity (Hinterberger
et al., 2003; Halder et al., 2011), which is clearly a neurocogni-
tive topic that is central but not restricted to BCI/NF. Broadly
speaking, not only BCI/NF but many other processes such as
meditation techniques (Tang et al., 2014), emotion regulation
(Thayer and Lane, 2000) and even psychotherapy (Beauregard,
2007) also induce some form of self-control of brain activity. Since
the definition of “BCI control” from either a neuroengineering
perspective or from a neurocognitive perspective fundamentally
differs, it is necessary to disentangle both views. The topic of
the present article is “BCI control” as self-regulation of neuronal
activity and, for the sake of transparency, it will be called hereafter
“self-control of brain activity”.
With the aim of better understanding BCI/NF learning,
the first step to characterize “self-control of brain activity” is
to specify the cognitive mechanisms responsible for learning
control. The more popular models of BCI/NF discuss “operant
conditioning” and a “motor skill learning” as these mechanisms
(Hammer et al., 2012). However, many studies indicate that
other cognitive mechanisms such as locus of control towards
technology (Burde and Blankertz, 2006; Ninaus et al., 2013; Witte
et al., 2013), aptitude towards BCI (Hammer et al., 2012; Halder
et al., 2013), motivation (Kleih et al., 2010) and spontaneous
strategies (Kober et al., 2013) also influence BCI or NF learning.
As a consequence, these predictors may either constitute a
secondary correlate of self-control of brain activity or may
represent key cognitive processes in addition to conditioning and
skill learning. Given the high variety of cognitive and emotional
processes apparently associated with self-control of brain activity
and BCI learning, it is particularly useful to define a simple but
comprehensible framework to evaluate the common and unique
contributions of each one of these processes.
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A dual-processes theory has been related to BCI/NF learning
(Lacroix, 1986; Hammer et al., 2012). In the following, we shortly
point out how this theory can be employed to better understand
how the processes mentioned above might determine self-control
of brain activity.
TWO TYPES OF MENTAL ACTIVITY
The dual-processes theory categorizes the whole mental activity
into two main types of processing: more automatic and capacity-
free processes (i.e., type I processes) vs. more controlled and
capacity-limited processes (i.e., type II processes). Type I pro-
cesses reflect the automatic, capacity-free, effortless and context-
specific information processing such as for instance trying to open
the office door with the home key because one has been thinking
about dinner. Moreover, type I processes are usually unconscious
and difficult to control by self-instruction. Type II processes
reflect the activity of a supervisory attention system, specialized in
monitoring and regulating the activity in other cognitive systems
(Shallice and Cooper, 2011). Type II processes are usually in the
center of our focus of attention (but see Horga and Maia, 2012
for an exception), are regulated mainly by self-instruction and are
fundamental for executive functions and metacognitive abilities
(Bewick et al., 1995). Accordingly, control beliefs are much more
related to the function of the type II processes while the heuristics
regulating most of our cognitive activity and behavior are type I
processes.
A central aspect of the dual-processes theory is that both auto-
matic and controlled processes have control of behavior as well as
of different aspects of cognition (Alos Ferrer, 2013) but both learn
from and react to different aspects of the task at hand. Automatic
systems learn only through cumulative reward while controlled
systems are more flexible, context-oriented and learn fast from
instructions. It is beyond the scope of this perspective article
to review every single manifestation of automatic vs. controlled
processing to each one of the predictors of self-control of brain
activity. Instead, we present one example regarding motivation,
which may suffice to make our point: motivation consists of a
more controlled component called intrinsic motivation, which is
highly sensitive to self-instruction and self-efficacy beliefs, and a
more automatic component called extrinsic motivation, which is
more sensitive to the current amount of reward received (Ryan
and Deci, 2000). Accordingly, as long as some reward can be
obtained during BCI/NF learning, automatic processing will pre-
dominate. Controlled processing will be engaged when negative
feedback predominates over longer periods of time and will have
a larger impact, if the participant shows high levels of intrinsic
motivation. In summary, dual-process models such as Lacroix
(1986) make clear that self-regulation is not a unitary process
but rather the result of the conjoint action of type I and type II
processes.
A FRAMEWORK OF SELF-CONTROL OF BRAIN ACTIVITY
Automatic and controlled processes determine self-control of
brain activity in very different ways. Even more, not every
cognitive process is necessary and sufficient to perform a specific
BCI/NF task, but instead a small subset may play a key role.
The remaining mental activity -that is neither necessary nor
sufficient for a specific BCI/NF task -will act on BCI/NF learning
in one of two ways: firstly, this activity can interfere with the
learning process, if it hampers self-control of the specific aspect of
brain activity being targeted in a specific BCI/NF task. Secondly,
activations can promote the learning process indirectly, if they
do not interfere with the activity in that small subset of both
automatic and controlled processes necessary and sufficient to
perform the BCI/NF task at hand. Although in some BCI classes
such as those employing electrocorticogram or other kinds of
stable and specific brain signals such as SSVEP the influence
of unspecific processes signal is barely important, cognitive
BCIs (Astrand et al., 2014) or BCI classes based on cognitive
tasks such as mental calculation and motor imagery (Halder
et al., 2011; Hammer et al., 2012) should be more subjected to
the effects of different forms of self-control over brain activity.
Based on the differentiation between automatic vs. controlled
processing as well as necessary vs. unnecessary processes, we
define a framework of self-control of brain activity.
We start with the automatic and controlled processes both
necessary and sufficient to perform BCI/NF tasks: both are
subsumed under local control network. The more the feedback
provided by BCI/NF reflects the activity in these networks, the
more efficient is the learning process. The role of automatic and
controlled processes in the local control network is complemen-
tary: automatic processes are driven directly by the amount and
quality of feedback obtained whereas controlled processes are
driven by the verbalizations and self-instruction (Lacroix, 1986),
that are largely under conscious control of the individual and
subjected to beliefs and expectations. While automatic learning is
very insensitive to verbal instructions and only takes place when
some pattern of reaction is systematically rewarded, controlled
processes are mainly driven by direct verbal instructions. Efficient
BCI/NF learning reflects the timely combination of both processes
depending on the present learning rates: when a steep learning
curve is forming, automatic processes take the lead, when the
learning curve temporarily flattens, controlled processes correct
the course by means of self-instruction (Lacroix, 1986). The
optimal level of self-control of brain activity in the local control
network is achieved under two main conditions: (i) avoidance
of irrelevant associations between internal states and external
reward; and (ii) staying engaged and focused on the task at hand
without distractions. As we will discuss below, condition (i) can
be achieved when activity in the organismic control network is
reduced to a minimum and condition (ii), when the central control
network frees the most of its limited resources for the local control
network.
We define a framework of three concentric circles (Figure 1)
representing three sources of self-control. First, the outmost and
thus most unspecific level of response to feedback reflects basically
automatic processes. Second, the middle circle depicts central
control networks performing controlled processing. Finally, in the
innermost level, we describe networks responding specifically to
the BCI/NF learning protocol. This local control relies on both
automatic and controlled processes.
We define those automatic processes unnecessary to perform
a given BCI/NF task as the organismic control network. We call
them organismic control because it reflects the activity of the
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FIGURE 1 | A schema of different types of self-control of the brain
activity. Specific cognitive processes such as for instance motivation,
mood, attention and executive functions are represented by black dots.
Black arrows connecting the dots represent the interactions between the
different cognitive functions. Two dots are depicted over the domain of
organismic control network to illustrate that these processes are largely
independent from one another. The contribution of the three types of
self-control to physiological signals is represented by the dashed lines
linking the specific cognitive processes to the physiological signals being
recorded for BCI/NF learning.
thousands of automatic and unconscious mental processes reg-
ulating the largest part of cognitive activity (Dijksterhuis and
Nordgren, 2006). The interference of these processes is high when
unnecessary automatic reactions to feedback are triggered, which
compete with the learning process taking place in the local control
network. Rumination, for instance, describes the intrusion of
negative feelings about past experiences in the stream of thoughts
and emerges primarily during relaxation (Nolen-Hoeksema et al.,
2008). The intrusion of ruminative thoughts is an example of
the negative impact of the organismic control network on self-
control of brain activity during BCI/NF learning. Cognitive pro-
cesses subsumed under organismic control network are not easily
influenced by direct instructions and mostly not even conscious
to the participant. Therefore, it may be very important to mon-
itor any signs of negative influences originating in organismic
control networks. This unwanted activity should be fed back in
a timely manner during training. As a consequence, processes like
increased anxiety or intrusive thoughts are accessible to BCI/NF
users and can trigger appropriate learning mechanisms capable to
control or suppress these processes.
Finally, we define the central control network as those controlled
processes not strictly necessary to perform a given BCI/NF
task. Controlled processes have limited capacity, so that every
bit of irrelevant information being employed in the central
control network will be missed by the local control network. The
negative impact of central control network is high when improper
strategies, self-instruction, over-instruction or excessive attention
to the self (Leary et al., 2006) withdraw resources from the local
control network and hamper the regulation of the learning process
in a similar way as a dual-task (Logan and Gordon, 2001) drains
resources. In contrast to the organismic control network, controlled
processing is largely under conscious control and can be modu-
lated directly by instructions (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006).
In summary, the aim of any BCI/NF learning is to magnify the
signal produced by local control networks and suppress as much
as possible the activity elsewhere. To do that, it is in our view
necessary to take into consideration the specificities of two types
of cognitive activity subsumed under organismic control networks
and central control networks, since they imply very different
learning mechanisms sensitive to different types of cues and
reward. On the one side, participants should learn to decouple
irrelevant from those relevant automatic processes. One way to
achieve this is to monitor the automatic processes regulating for
instance negative emotional reactions and anxiety as well as with
a more selective schedule of reward and punishment. On the
other side, participants should learn to use the central control
networks to suppress irrelevant cognitive activity operating under
conscious control such as excessive attention to the self (Leary
et al., 2006). This can be achieved by direct instruction or self-
instruction. Once this balance is achieved, the outcome of BCI/NF
learning should be improved. Among many other possibilities,
one simple experiment to investigate how the suppression of
irrelevant cognitive activity could improve BCI/NF learning
would involve the monitoring of inner speech (Perrone-Bertolotti
et al., 2014). Extra feedback requiring focus on the concrete task is
presented when an increase in the levels of inner speech is detected
in combination with a local flattening of the learning curve. As
suggested by Leary et al. (2006), this extra feedback should help
to reduce excessive attention to the self and improve learning.
FINAL REMARKS
We propose that self-regulation of brain activity should be dis-
tinguished from the more general process of “BCI learning”, since
the latter one is more of a neuroengineering problem whereas the
former is mainly a neurocognitive problem. To better understand
how self-regulation of brain activity works, we propose to look at
the cognitive predictors of BCI/NF performance from the point
of view of a framework which organizes them according to the
main type of cognitive processing required: more automatic or
more controlled processing. Further on, we distinguish between
cognitive resources necessary and sufficient for BCI/NF learning
and other cognitive processes, which should be suppressed or
down-regulated to improve learning. Finally, we argue that our
framework can be very useful to optimize BCI learning, since
it predicts the most suitable tools to modulate the activation
generated by automatic and controlled cognitive processes.
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